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Abstract. Current US counterinsurgency doctrine is gendered diversely in the diﬀerent
geographic locations where it is formulated, put in practice, and experienced. Where Iraqi
and Afghan populations are subjected to counterinsurgency and its attendant development
policy, spaces are made legible in gendered ways, and people are targeted – for violence or
‘nation-building’ – on the basis of gender-categorisation. Second, this gendering takes its
most incendiary form in the seam of encounter between counterinsurgent foot-soldiers and
the locals, where sexuality is weaponised and gender is most starkly cross-hatched with class
and race. Finally, in the Metropole, new masculinities and femininities are forged in the
domain of counterinsurgency policymaking: While new soldier-scholars represent a softened
masculinity, counterinsurgent women increasingly become visible in policy circles, with both
using ostensibly feminist justifications for their involvement.
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Introduction
Counterinsurgency – defined as asymmetrical warfare by a powerful military
against irregular combatants supported by a civilian population – is as old as
warfare itself. Although the term itself was coined by John F. Kennedy in 1960,
this particular method of fighting has long been a mainstay of colonial war-fighting
and imperial policing.1 While a substantial portion of the training, doctrinal
development and war-fighting capabilities of European colonial militaries was
devoted to this type of war in their overseas colonies, the US Army also
accumulated counterinsurgency experience in its colonial expansion westwards
which resulted in asymmetric warfare against Native Americans, and their ultimate
suppression and circumscription in reservations.2
1 Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance: 1950 to the Present
(London: Collier Macmillan, 1977); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
(New York: Praeger, 1964); Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya
(London: Pimlico, 2005); Alastair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 (New York:
New York Review of Books, 2006 [1977]); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion,
Insurgency, Peacekeeping (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1971); John Newsinger, British Counter-
insurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); Anthony Short,
The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960 (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1975).
2 Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860–1941
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Oﬃce, 1997); also see Stephen W. Silliman, ‘The “Old
West” in the Middle East: US Military Metaphors in Real and Imagined Indian Country’, American
Anthropologist, 110 (2008), pp. 237–47.
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As anti-colonial struggles spread across the globe in the wake of the Second
World War, counterinsurgency also became a central component of both military
war-fighting and social, political, and economic transformations in soon-to-be-
former colonies. Even after the 1960s when the majority of former colonies in Asia
and Africa had become independent from colonial rule, counterinsurgency contin-
ued to be an important element of US military policy in Latin America, and to a
lesser extent, elsewhere.
Since the end of the Cold War, counterinsurgency has become more closely
associated with a family of other military operations which do not necessarily
resemble conventional (usually inter-state) war-fighting. Along with foreign internal
defence (that is, provision of indirect aid and military advice and advisors to
foreign allies’ militaries), stability operations, and reconstruction operations,
counterinsurgency is now considered the most significant and frequent form of
warfare to be fought across the world and into the future.3 As a US Navy strategy
document argues, this form of conflict necessitates a partnership between ‘govern-
ments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the pri-
vate sector’4 to ensure continued ‘stable functioning of the international system’
which guarantees the ‘core interests’ of the US.5
Despite the long history of ‘small’ wars and colonial counterinsurgencies,
today’s advocates of population-centric counterinsurgency (in which the civilian
population is persuaded to defect to the counterinsurgent forces, often counter-
posed to enemy-centric counterinsurgency which is predicated on the use of
violence to deter civilians from cooperating with the insurgents) present it as the
‘soft option’, especially as compared with scorched earth military tactics where
annihilation of the enemy has been the end goal. In the population-centric doctrine
advanced in the US Army and Marines Counterinsurgency Manual (FM3–24) and
other current classics of counterinsurgency (including John Nagl’s Eating Soup with
a Knife and David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla), kinetic force (or the killing
capacity of the military) is to take backstage, foregrounding developmental
language and agendas such as ‘a vibrant economy, political participation, and re-
stored hope’,6 psychological and information operations,7 the use of local proxies,8
3 T. X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, MN: Zenith Press,
2006); Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military, from Mongolia
to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond (New York: Vintage Books, 2005); David Kilcullen, The
Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: Hurst & Co, 2009);
Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing, 2008); John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from
Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); US, Department of the Army,
FM3–24: The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007); FM3–07: The US Army Stability Operations Field Manual (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2009).
4 US Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007), available at:
{http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf}, pp. 6, 7, accessed on 30 March 2009.
5 US Army, FM3–07, p. ix.
6 Ibid., FM3–24, p. 49.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.; Laleh Khalili, ‘Tangled Webs of Coercion: Parastatal Production of Violence in Abu Ghraib’,
in Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler (eds), Prisons and Policing in the Modern Middle East and
North Africa (London: Hurst & Co., 2010).
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and ‘the integration of civilian and military eﬀorts’ including aid and governance9
in order to ultimately win over a largely uncommitted civilian population.10
This coding of counterinsurgency as the civilisanised option which aims at
winning the hearts and minds of civilian populations and persuading them to
support the counterinsurgents has a particularly gendered character. What I mean
by gendering is a set of practices and discourses that constitute ‘men’ and ‘women’
and masculinities and femininities in particular ways. Gendering is neither about
women alone,11 nor is it a pure and autonomous dichotomy. Rather, masculinities
and femininities, especially in imperial contexts, are already always ‘cross-hatched’
with racial and class designations.12
At one level, counterinsurgency itself is presented as the opposite of a more
mechanised, technologically advanced, higher-fire-power form of warfare. Given
that the latter is often coded as hyper-masculine, the former is considered feminine.
Second, the very object of population-centric counterinsurgency would be per-
ceived as feminine, since the focus of counterinsurgency is the transformation of
civilian allegiances and remaking of their social world. On the one hand, in the
binary categorisation which forms the basis of mainstream discourses about war,
civilian (feminine) is the opposite of combatant (masculine). On the other hand
those spaces and subjectivities which regular warfare destroys as a matter of side-
eﬀect rather than intent, or which are considered ‘collateral’ to the main job of
war-fighting in conventional warfare, are demarginalised, brought into focus, and,
in some senses, made central to the work of military and civilian counterinsurgents.
These spaces and subjectivities are perceived by both the military and the civilians
as gendered in particular and specific sorts of ways. Finally, the practice of
counterinsurgency itself is predicated on ‘telling’ (combatants from civilians,
hostiles from friendlies etc.),13 invading, organising, fighting, detaining, transform-
ing, and destroying on the basis of gender (cross-hatched with class and race).
We know from a wealth of scholarship that war and violence have always been
gendered, classed and racialised not only in the practical way they are fought but
also in the longer term or quotidian manner they shape social relations (and are
shaped by them). Moreover, we know that the discursive practices surrounding war
also reproduce extant gendered hierarchies through the constant reproduction of
a dichotomous rhetoric of masculinities and femininities.14 What is new with
9 William Easterly, ‘Foreign Aid Goes Military!’, New York Review of Books, LV (2008), pp. 51–4; US
Army, FM3–24, p. 54.
10 For a social-scientific discussion of this process, see Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
11 Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Denise
Riley, ‘Am I that Name?’ Feminism and the Category of ‘Women’ in History (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1989).
12 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (London:
Routledge, 1995).
13 On ‘telling’, see Allen Feldman, Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political
Terror in Northern Ireland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 56–9.
14 Terrell Carver, ‘Being a Man’, Government and Opposition, 41 (2006), pp. 450–68; ‘The Machine in
the Man’, in Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski (eds), Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender
and Violence in International Relations (London: Zed Press, 2008), pp. 70–86; Cynthia Enloe, The
Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993); Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, 2nd edition
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing
Women’s Lives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); The Curious Feminist: Searching for
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counterinsurgency is the extent to which the centrality of civilians as potential
objects of military operations is acknowledged in doctrine and practice, even
(perhaps especially) as civilians are instrumentalised as part and process of the
war.15 The complex process by which ‘civilians’ are mapped to particular gender
grids, and men and women are ‘read’ and interpellated according to the
constructed notion of ‘civilian’ is one of the central forms that this counter-
insurgency gendering takes. Further, as mentioned above, counterinsurgency
doctrine and practice directly bring those bodies and spaces previously coded as
‘private’ or ‘feminine’ – women, non-combatant men, and the spaces of the ‘home’
– into the battlefield; transform cities and homes and persons into highly gendered
segments of the ‘physical and human terrain’; and utilise detailed knowledge about
the quotidian (both perceived and coded as feminine) as ‘ethnographic intelli-
gence’.16 This conquered and gendered space, in which an indigenous population
is controlled, surveilled, monitored, and made to acquiesce, is the first site where
I shall analyse gendered practices of counterinsurgency.
In the US ‘War on Terror’ the gendering of the face-to-face encounter between
the US military and the indigenous Iraqi and Afghan populations has been very
conspicuous. This is not only the case in the starkly sexualised imagery and
practices of interrogation in Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo and elsewhere,17 but also
in the hierarchies and discourses produced in the context of US forces training
indigenous police and military divisions. I call this second site of gendering the
seam of encounter, where the ‘imperial grunts’18 – who are the foot-soldiers of the
US military, often from lower class backgrounds, frequently belonging to
African-American or Latino or non-citizen communities, and sometimes women –
directly and repeatedly encounter the conquered, whether the latter are those
detained and subjected to interrogation or the local proxy security forces being
trained by the US military. Here, gendering takes a variety of forms, but most
prominent are transformation of sexuality into technologies of coercion, the
infliction of abjection via eﬀeminising practices, and the attempt at securing
acquiescence through reproducing gendered, raced, and classed hierarchies.
The third site of gendering is the location of production of counterinsurgency
policy and doctrine. Here, the gendering of counterinsurgency takes a peculiar
Women in a New Age of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Cynthia Cockburn,
‘The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace’, in Wenona Giles and
Jennifer Hyndman (eds), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004), pp. 24–44; Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense
Intellectuals’, Signs, 12 (1987), pp. 687–718; ‘“Clean Bombs” and Clean Language’, in Jean Bethke
Elshtain and Sheila Tobias (eds), Women, Militarism and War (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 1990), pp. 33–56; Zillah Eisenstein, Sexual Decoys: Gender, Race and War (London: Zed
Books, 2007).
15 See especially Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla.
16 Helen Kinsella, ‘Securing the Civilian: Sex and Gender in the Laws of War’, in Michael Barnett and
Raymond Duvall (eds), Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
pp. 249–72; Charli Carpenter, Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms and the Protection of
Civilians (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2006); Cockburn, The Curious Feminist, p. 35; Michael A.
Innes, ‘Protected Status, Sacred Sites, Black Holes and Human Agents: System, Sanctuary and
Terrain Complexity’, Civil Wars, 10 (2008), pp. 1–5; Lt. Col. Fred Renzi, ‘Networks: Terra Incognita
and the Case for Ethnographic Intelligence’, Military Review (2006), pp. 16–24.
17 Tara McKelvey, Monstering: Inside America’s Policy of Secret Interrogations and Torture in the
Terror War (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2007); Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, Mothers,
Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics (London: Zed Books, 2007).
18 Kaplan, Imperial Grunts.
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shape. Most strikingly, a new form of masculinity emerges, authorised by
consumerism and neo-liberal feminism, in which ‘manliness’ is softened, and the
sensitive masculinity of the humanitarian soldier-scholar (white, literate, articulate,
and doctorate-festooned) overshadows the hyper-masculinity of warrior kings (or
indeed of the racialised imperial grunts). This concurrent transformation of what
masculinity or femininity may mean in the domain of policymaking allows spaces
for white middle class women civilians to move into prestigious political positions
as counterinsurgents,19 all the while casting their own advance as a broader victory
for the universal woman.
Even (perhaps especially) here, gendering is never innocent of racial or class
hierarchies. Women are increasingly entering the militaries of European and North
American nations and becoming further integrated into combat (or combat-
support) roles,20 albeit in racialised and hierarchical sorts of ways, while more and
more white middle-class women also enter the higher ranks of policymaking. It
must be of some significance that three out of four most recent US Secretaries of
State have been women; less commented upon has been the increasingly visible
presence of women – white, middle-class, educated women – in the US Department
of Defense and in security-related think tanks. This rise of a particular category of
women, espousing a particular species of feminism, is itself indicative of a kind of
femininity which is comfortable with, and in fact positively values, breaking
through security spaces coded as masculine, and which appropriates many of the
‘new masculine’ qualities of the soldier-scholars, perhaps as a subspecies of what
Judith Butler has provocatively called drag, or ‘an uncritical appropriation of
sex-role stereotyping’.21 These female security-wonks celebrate work in masculinist
policy spaces and with the military as an index of ‘having made it’, in this case into
the often-closed domain of military masculinity.
Furthermore, the space of counterinsurgent intellectuals, consisting of both the
soldier-scholars and the women-of-power, considerably overlaps with the epistemic
community around humanitarian military interventions. The latter includes a
significant proportion of female oﬃcials, is coded as feminine work, and enjoys
strong and visible advocacy for it by a number of articulate female scholars and
policy wonks who move with ease between the academy, think tanks, and
policymaking circles.
This article, then, argues that in understanding and critiquing what has
happened in all the battlefields of the so-called War on Terror, gender analysis
becomes not just a complementary form of analysis but a central one. What I hope
to do in this article based on extensive archival and ethnographic research is to
examine the gendering of counterinsurgency practices, at the point of making of
policy, at the seam of encounter, and at the site of implementation of counterin-
surgency, and to critically reflect on the manifold and complex forms of gendering
that mutually constitute counterinsurgency practice. I will argue that the confluence
19 Spencer Ackerman, ‘Women Prominent in Defense Movement: Seventh Instalment of the Rise of
Counterinsurgents’, Washington Independent (2008) available at: {http://washingtonindependent.com/
673/women-prominent-in-defense-movement} accessed on 31 December 2008.
20 Francine D’Amico and Laurie Weinstein (eds), Gender Camouflage: Women and the US Military
(New York: New York University Press, 1999); Erin Solaro, Women in the Line of Fire: What You
Should Know about Women in the Military (Emeryville, CA: Seal Press, 2006).
21 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 174.
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of gendering and counterinsurgency practice works to create particular imperial
hierarchies in which one’s gender does not tell us anything about one’s location in
the hierarchies, and where diﬀerent masculinities and femininities can coexist
simultaneously if inflected through the lens of racialisation and class.
I use gender here not to stand in for ‘women’ but as a set of social practices
and relations which – intertwined in complex ways with class, ‘race’, sexuality, and
geopolitical location – determine the meaning of ‘man’ and ‘woman’. While sexed
bodies bear physiological characteristics that ostensibly distinguish a female body
from a male body (but note that even here the social conventions of gender aﬀects
the construction and naming of sexes), gender relations define what is masculine or
feminine, where particular attributes are said to inhere in ‘men’ and ‘women’, and
therefore diﬀerent systems of values can be said to derive from masculine or
feminine subjects.
Gendered micro-practices of counterinsurgency in the field
Because of the centrality of the civilian in counterinsurgency, gender relations are
also inevitably transformed as the basis of counterinsurgency action. This works
through demographics, through targeting of women specifically as counterbalanc-
ing forces to male radicalisation, through the cooptation of gendered spaces to
counterinsurgency practice, and the use of gendered ‘telling’ to distinguish those
who are to be protected from those who are to be feared or destroyed.
Gender demographics are here often invoked as both justification for targeting
young men, and more instrumentally, for planning military action. ‘Youth bulges’,
a demographic profusion of men between the ages of 15 and 30, especially in
Muslim countries, is seen as a structural condition underlying extremism, and as
a ‘problem’ to be addressed militarily in far away places. Young men are seen as
an automatically useful resource for radical recruitment, and women’s education
and job-creation programmes are advocated as ‘necessary antidotes’.22 This
ostensible gender imbalance is utilised to demobilise militant groups. As a former
US defence oﬃcial wrote, ‘governments can use groups’ ambivalence about female
members to state advantage. Israel and Russia use stories of socially marginal
women being exploited by men to discredit terrorist groups and explain away
female violence’.23 A more diﬃcult route to countering the ostensible eﬀects of the
youth bulge is through economic development. Like a great deal of social science
written in support of US counterinsurgencies in the 1960s,24 the contemporary
material about nation-building inherits much from the modernisation theory
22 Lionel Beehner, ‘The Battle of the “Youth Bulge”’ (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Daily
Analysis, 27 April 2007) available at: {http://www.cfr.org/publication/13094/battle_of_the_youth_
bulge.html} accessed on 31 March 2009; for a scathing critique see, Göran Therborn, ‘NATO’s
Demographer’, New Left Review, 56 (2009), pp. 136–44.
23 Alisa Stack-O’Connor, ‘Picked Last: Women and Terrorism’, Joint Forces Quarterly, 44 (2007),
pp. 95–101.
24 For an analysis of this category of social science, see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future:
Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2003) and David
Milne, America’s Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008).
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advanced by Walt Rostow and his colleagues in the 1960s.25 Here, the salvation
stage of liberal democracy requires economic development and one of the most
prominent pathways of economic development is the socio-economic advancement
of women.26 In this literature, women are essentialised as being less corrupt, more
eﬃcient, better for economic development, and less warlike.27 The feminised
security discourse is deployed by all and sundry, and gender mainstreaming
becomes even central to military intervention.28 Policymakers, for example, argue
that by providing economic development specifically to suit women, women can be
saved from alienation and thus radicalisation. Women are cast as wholly
socio-economic beings, divested of politics or ethics. Under the heading of ‘Why
the Military Should Care’ two US oﬃcers, both of them women, suggest that ‘by
collaborating with USAID and using [Women in Development]’s expertise on
gender integration as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, the
military can more eﬀectively address the negative socioeconomic conditions that
make areas ripe for terrorist exploitation’.29 In a highly influential and much-
circulated set of guidance notes, the counterinsurgency guru David Kilcullen
similarly argues that ‘coopting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social
and economic programmes, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that
eventually undermine the insurgents [. . .] Win the women, and you own the family
unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the
population’ on the side of the counterinsurgents.30 Thus, advancing women’s rights
through modernisation is automatically seen as meeting the national security
interests of the US. A significant element of counterinsurgency thus becomes
provision of social services which are often allocated to women and are seen as
another way in which counterinsurgency action can win over a local population
into collaboration and loyalty. For example, a Rand analyst (and the wife of Bush
Administration oﬃcial Zalmay Khalilzad) writes that
[h]ealth-care operations have been particularly eﬀective in winning local support [in
Afghanistan]. On repeated occasions, female patients in health clinics, thankful for care
received and motivated to support the new order that provided it, have volunteered
valuable tactical information to US forces.31
In the field, counterinsurgency transforms the population it is intended to pacify
into a human terrain which can be made visible, knowable, and malleable. The
25 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960).
26 A WorldBank study of women’s empowerment shows that much of the literature on empowerment
was actually more interested on how empowerment of women aﬀected other development indicators:
Anju Malhorta, Sidny Schuler and Carol Boender, ‘Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a
Variable in International Development’ (Washington DC: World Bank, background paper, 2002),
p. 23.
27 Cheryl Bernard et al., Women and Nation-Building (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008). On
corruption and eﬃciency, see David Dollar, R. Fisman, and R. Gatti, ‘Are Women Really the
“Fairer Sex”? Corruption and Women in Government’, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 46 (2001), pp. 423–29.
28 Lieutenant Colonel Miemie Winn Byrd and Major Gretschen Decker, ‘Why the US Should Gender
Its Counterterrorism Strategy’, Military Review (July–August 2008), p. 96.
29 Ibid., p. 100.
30 David Kilcullen, ‘“Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency’,
Military Review (May–June 2006): pp. 103–8.
31 Bernard et al., Women, p. 13.
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Human Terrain System (HTS) of the US military, for example, couples military
oﬃcers with social scientists who are to interview the local populations, to
understand not only their needs and wants, but also their kinship structures, the
peculiarities of their gender relations, their way of living, their relationship with
others around them, and beyond.32 These specifically gendered structures of life are
reified, fixed in time and space, mobilised as ‘useful facts’ about the civilian
population, and transformed into military intelligence. For example, a paper
produced by the Human Terrain System’s research unit is specifically named after
gendered kinship structures, ‘My Cousin’s Enemy Is My Friend’, arguing that
rural Pashtuns have well-developed methods to resolve conflicts through jirga mediation
and the exchange of property or women.
The result of this special kind of intra-family relationship is that, during times when
conflicts aggravate first-cousin hostility, the sides don’t necessarily break down along
‘closest male relative’ lines. Whereas in a classical Middle East tribal situation, all the
participants in a conflict pick sides based on which side represents their closest male
relative, Pashtuns establish temporary factional groupings that are unpredictable and not
necessarily based on familial relationships.33
Here, Pashtun kinship ties are taken as timeless facts to be contrasted to some
idealised, homogenous, equally timeless ‘classical Middle Eastern tribal situation’
even as the paper again and again indicates that ‘tribal’ structures can and do vary
across time and space. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, gender, familial, and kinship
ties are seen as the bases of military strategy, whereby, diﬀerent tribal structures
can determine whether or not ‘surges’ of troops can be eﬀective.34
Just as important, the very sites of counterinsurgency are usually civilian spaces
that are then walled oﬀ (both figuratively and literally) as a sub-section of the
battle-space, a grid square that can be more easily pacified. In counterinsurgency,
all spaces, and perhaps especially urban quarters, are seen as potential battle-
grounds by the counterinsurgents. The conventional privacy measures for homes
and the peacefulness of everyday spaces are no longer guaranteed. Spaces often not
only coded as feminine but also considered women’s domain (homes, hospitals and
schools especially) are frequently invaded by counterinsurgents.35 These ‘private’ or
civilian spaces – the home, the school, the hospital, the market, the village – are
increasingly targeted in modern wars, and in fact were specifically the object of
intense bombing in conventional warfare in the twentieth century. What counter-
insurgency does, however, is to try to transform these spaces without necessarily
destroying them (although destruction – especially in the wake of population
resettlement is often inevitable), thus coopting everyday spaces into the landscape
of war. Inevitably, these everyday landscapes are inhabited by civilians who are
also made to be figures in the ongoing counterinsurgency. The utilisation of these
32 AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence
Communities (CEAUSSIC), ‘Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept
Program’ (14 October 2009) available at: {http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/commissions/CEAUSSIC/
upload/CEAUSSIC_HTS_Final_Report.pdf} accessed on 21 December 2009.
33 TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System, ‘My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun
“Tribes” in Afghanistan’ (Ft Leavenworth: US Army Training and Doctrine, Afghanistan Research
Reachback Center White Paper, 2009), p. 10.
34 TRADOC G2 HTS, ‘My Cousin’s Enemy’, p. 5.
35 Eyal Weizman, ‘Waking through Walls: Soldiers as Architects in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’,
Radical Philosophy Review, 136 (2006), pp. 8–22.
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spaces in counterinsurgency is directly and intimately tied up with the ways in
which counterinsurgency practice makes men and women legible and assigns them
to diﬀerent categories of various utility for combat and pacification.
Because counterinsurgency requires the categorisation of population into
combatants and non-combatants, and because the easiest way to quickly identify
and categorise populations as high-risk combatants or low-risk civilians is by
gender, the combatant/non-combatant distinction becomes fully gendered, where
the all-encompassing suspicion against all men is operationalised into specific
actions (to be discussed below), while women are aﬀorded the status of being
‘naïve’ objects of ‘protection’, pacification, and humanitarian salvage. We already
know that this gendering produces a ‘masculinist logic of protection’,36 and that
the object of military intervention, humanitarian aid, and primary focus of concern
in a post-conflict environment becomes an undiﬀerentiated ‘womenandchildren’.37
What counterinsurgency does is to transform the ‘womenandchildren’ into either
actors considered by the counterinsurgent to be complicit with the combatants, a
terrain upon whom the counterinsurgency’s social engineering experiments can be
performed, or, increasingly, as hostages and literal or symbolic message-bearers for
the work of counterinsurgency. Importantly, given the paucity of distinguishing
features between civilians and combatants, the gendered process of telling
‘womenandchildren’ from others becomes central to targeting processes in coun-
terinsurgencies.38
In 2004, for example, a large number of Iraqi cities were either surrounded by
barbed wire, under constant monitoring, or both. House invasions were often the
norm. In these circumstances, women became direct targets of violence. They were
taken as hostages to compel the men to surrender,39 their homes were destroyed,
and they were specifically targeted because of a purportedly intuitive understanding
of the enormity of attacking women and the ways in which such targeting could
‘send a message’ to others.40 In one instance, the US
soldiers came to the house of an Iraqi man suspected of hijacking trucks. He wasn’t there,
but his wife and two other women answered the door. ‘You have 15 minutes to get your
furniture out,’ First Sgt. Ghaleb Mikel said. The women wailed and shouted but ultimately
complied, dragging their bed and couch and television set out the front door. Mikel’s men
36 Judith Hick Stiehm, ‘The protected, the protector, the defender’, Women’s Studies International
Forum, 5 (1982), pp. 367–77; Ann Tickner, Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the
Post-Cold War Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Iris Marion Young, ‘The Logic
of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State’, Signs, 29 (2003), pp. 1–25;
Kinsella, ‘Securing the Civilian’.
37 Enloe, Morning After, p. 166.
38 An extreme instance of the gender segmentation of civilian victims could be observed during the
Israeli assault upon Gaza in 2008/2009 when most media outlets tallying the casualties of the Israeli
attack only counted ‘womenandchildren’ as ‘innocent’ victims, and men were automatically excluded
from such rosters of victimhood and trauma by the fact of their sex. An even more extreme instance
of the counterinsurgency cooptation of women and children as possibly complicit with the insurgents
is Alan Dershowitz’s defence of Israeli military’s violence against civilians, where only babies are
considered to be rightfully civilians. See, Alan Dershowitz, ‘“Civilian casualty”? That’s
a gray area’, Los Angeles Times (22 July 2002); also see Alice Hills, ‘Hearts and Minds or Search
and Destroy? Controlling Civilians in Urban Operations’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 13 (2002),
pp. 1–24.
39 S. G. Mestrovic, The Trials of Abu Ghraib: An Expert Witness Account of Shame and Honor
(Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), p. 124.
40 Cecilia M. Bailliet, ‘“War in the Home”: An Exposition of Protection Issues Pertaining to the Use
of House Raids in Counterinsurgency Operations’, Journal of Military Ethics, 6 (2007), p. 185.
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then fired four antitank missiles into their house, blowing it to pieces and setting it afire.
The women were left holding their belongings [. . .] At a news conference in November
2003, Sanchez, the top commander in Iraq, acknowledged that he had authorized the
destruction of homes thought to be used by insurgents. That same month, American
oﬃcers said they detained the wife and daughter of Gen. Izzat Ibrahim, a high-ranking
member of Hussein’s government who was still at large. The hope, they said, was that the
women could lead them to Ibrahim.41
Men are diﬀerentially targeted in these wars. In the cordoned cities where retinal
scans, thumb prints, identity cards and registers of residence are used to monitor
the populations,42 men between the ages of 15 or 16 and 50 are considered the
primary target of this intensive, aggressive, and invasive surveillance.43 As a US
military oral history of Falluja recounted,
One of our biggest challenges [. . .] was who do you let out and who do you not? What are
the rules and the screening procedures? And when they’re let out, where do they go? So the
bottom line answer was that military-aged men, defined as 16 to 55, would not be
permitted to leave, but children and women certainly could leave. We had all the Marines
and soldiers fully understanding those rules and how you were to search people before
they’d be let out. So one of the tasks we faced was this ‘humanitarian’ task of folks that
want to flee this unbelievable combat environment. How you do that so you didn’t put
your soldiers at risk and you didn’t let a key target out?44
But despite their assertions, even young boys were not exempted from suspicion
and monitoring. A re-evaluation of the fighting in Falluja by a military oﬃcial
asserted that
Insurgents blended into the civilian population and forced or persuaded civilians to assist
them. Iraqi children made roadblocks, served as messengers, and manned Ops. One military
AAR [After Action Review] notes that boys lugged mortar shells to insurgent positions.45
This targeting of men also conveniently serves another function. It allows for the
soldiers to specifically eﬀeminise the men of the population through both symbolic
and practical emasculation. Such tactics include the undressing of men at check-
points and in prisons and the use of language which is intended to dishonour men.
This partially comes out of an orientalist understanding of what is considered
honourable or shameful in ‘Muslim culture’ and which presents this culture’s
notions of indignity and abuse as exceptional.46 As a former US military
interrogator recounts, the interrogators’ cultural training, based on the infamous
The Arab Mind by Rafael Patai, included such admonitions as ‘Men should not
touch Arab women – female soldiers should avoid touching Arab men’,47 thus
41 Dexter Filkins, ‘The Fall of the Warrior King’, New York Times Magazine (23 October 2005).
42 Charles Levinson, ‘Fallujah Safer but Residents Still Lack Basic Services’, USA Today (24 January
2008).
43 On the targeting of men, see Adam Jones (ed.), Gendercide and Genocide (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 2004).
44 Colonel Michael Formica (21 April 2006) quoted in Kendall D. Gott, Eyewitness to War, Volume
1: The US Army in Operation Al-Fajr, an Oral History (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute
Press, 2006), p. 33.
45 Sean A. Edwards, Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah I, April 2004 (Fort Belvoir, VA: US
Army National Ground Intelligence Center, 2006), p. 12.
46 See a critique of this idea in Jasbir Puar, ‘Abu Ghraib: Arguing against Exceptionalism’, Feminist
Studies, 30 (2004), pp. 522–34.
47 Tony Lagouranis and Allen Mikaelian, Fear Up Harsh: An Army Interrogator’s Dark Journey
through Iraq (New York: NAL Caliber, 2007); on Patai, see Edward Said, Orientalism (New York,
Vintage Books, 1978), pp. 308–9. On the US military’s use of Patai, see Patrick Porter, Military
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casting sexualised abuse as particularly abhorrent to Arabs, and in a sense
reproducing orientalist gender stereotypes about the objects of counterinsurgency.
More broadly and perhaps in a less directly intentioned way, the requirements
of counterinsurgency re-engineer the gendering of economic relations. Maya
Rosenfeld’s illuminating ethnography of the Deheisheh Palestinian refugee camp in
the West Bank shows that because of the strict limits placed on the movement of
men, their ability to find jobs is severely curtailed. As women are subjected to a
slightly less severe regime of controls, they can more easily find jobs, and keep their
jobs. As such, the burden of labour is either shifted to women in a family (and
sometimes even to the daughters in a family) or more equally divided, inevitably
shifting the grounds of gender in particular ways that are not always positive.48
Working women who are forced to fend for their families under conditions of war
and occupation – rather than a slow social transformation and self-sustaining
mobilisation – are subjects of gossip, their youthful leisure is heavily circumscribed,
their possibilities of further education is curtailed, and their labour is often
exploited much more extensively. The men who have been thus sidelined suﬀer
from depression and a loss of identity, and find themselves displaced. Because of
necessity, such re-engineering also transforms unemployed men into willing
conscripts into burgeoning security forces which often appear in such conditions of
occupations, thus structurally reproducing the conditions of conflict.
The seam of imperial encounter
A more complicated set of gendering practices occurs not at the endpoint of
application of counterinsurgency force, but at the seam of encounter between the
occupying military forces and the people subjected to counterinsurgency. This seam
is the messy interstitial space in which the cross-hatching of race, gender, class, and
empire all produce unexpected hierarchical positioning.
Here, two groups in particular stand out: the women from the invading and
occupying military and the local men who serve as the proxy enforcers of order for
the invading military.
In the first instance, the displacement of inequalities to a neo-colonial setting
suddenly inverts orders of hierarchy, and women from disadvantaged backgrounds
can suddenly become powerful players positioned against and above local males.
This inversion of hierarchies is reinforced by representing the arrested and
incarcerated men as rapists and of the local male population as oppressors of their
wives and families.49 As Anne McClintock has written in a diﬀerent context,
The vast fissured architecture of imperialism was gendered throughout by the fact that it
was white men who made and enforced laws and policies in their own interests.
Nonetheless, the rationed privileges of race all too often put white women in positions of
decided – if borrowed – power, not only over colonized women but also over colonized
men. As such, white women were not the hapless onlookers of empire but were
Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), pp. 60–1.
48 Maya Rosenfeld, Confronting the Occupation: Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian
Families in a Refugee Camp (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004).
49 McKelvey, Monstering, p. 103.
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ambiguously complicit both as colonizer and colonized, privileged and restricted, acted
upon and acting.50
The peculiarities of this positioning, where working class women from the least
privileged parts of the US found themselves in positions of power vis-à-vis Iraqi
men, has been best personified in the narratives about Lynndie England and
Sabrina Harman. England and Harman have become iconic figures, symbolising
the torture inflicted upon Iraqi men in the Abu Ghraib prison. The former held a
leash encircling the neck of a naked Iraqi man curled up into a vulnerable foetal
position; the latter had herself photographed smiling cherubically and giving a
thumbs-up sign while leaning close to the dead body of a visibly bruised and
battered Iraqi general. The US prison guards and interrogators who had inflicted
pain upon Iraqi captives never managed to generate the same sense of disgust as
England and Harman; they were never made the archetypes of US torture, nor
their names were came to be known as universally as the two figures above. Not
only were England and Harman the iconic representations of transgressive women,
they were also subtly the embodiment of a new hierarchy of power, in which white
women were automatically placed in superior position to men who in other
circumstances would have been the expected superiors (as an Iraqi general’s class
position would be more privileged than that of a daughter of a police detective,
Harman, or a poultry factory worker, England).
In the instances where women have been used as interrogators, their bodies and
their sexuality have been deployed as technologies of power. In one of the most
disturbing accounts of interrogations at the Guantánamo Bay prisons, a male
interrogator writes about female interrogators using their breasts, their bodies, and
their menstrual blood as necessary tools for achieving dictated aims. The narrative
recounted is long, but strikingly persuasive in this regards:
We returned to the [interrogation] booth. Brooke [female interrogator] and I were both in
our sanitized (our names were taped over) BDUs [battle-dress uniform]. To my surprise,
she started to unbutton her top slowly, teasingly, almost like a stripper, revealing a
skin-tight brown Army T-shirt stretching over her chest.
Fareek [the Saudi prisoner] wouldn’t look at her. ‘What is the matter, Fareek? Don’t
you like women?’ As she said this, she stood in front of him and tried to make him look at
her body. She walked slowly behind him and began rubbing her breast against his back.
‘Do you like these big American tits, Fareek?’ She said [. . .]
‘What do you think, Fareek?’ she said, placing her hands on her breast [. . .] He
glanced, saw what she was doing, and immediately looked away.
‘Are you gay? Why do you keep looking at him?’ Brooke asked, referring to me [. . .]
She started unbuttoning her BDU pants. ‘Fareek, did you know that I’m having my
period?’ she said. She placed her hands in her pants as she started to circle behind the
detainee. ‘How do you feel about me touching you now?’ [. . .]
Brooke came back around his other side, and he could see that she was beginning to
withdraw her hand from her pants. As it became visible, the Saudi saw what looked like
red blood on her hand [. . .] ‘You fuck,’ she hissed, wiping what he believed was menstrual
blood on his face [. . .]
‘What do you think your brothers will think of you in the morning when they see an
American woman’s menstrual blood on your face?’ Brooke said, standing up. ‘By the way,
we’ve shut oﬀ the water to your cell tonight, so the blood will still be there tomorrow’.51
50 McClintock, Imperial Leather, p. 6.
51 Erik Saar and Viveca Novak, Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier’s Witness Account of
Life at Guantánamo (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 223–8; See also, Paisley Dodds, ‘Sex
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The uncritical self-abnegation of the white interrogator woman in the service of
some nationalist understanding of ‘national security’ is part of the peculiar
gendering of counterinsurgency practices. In conventional wars where laws of war
and the Geneva Conventions apply, such interrogations would not, could not,
happen with the degree of legitimacy and sangfroid which seemed to have
happened in the War on Terror.
Jessica Lynch’s narrative similarly served to reproduce the hierarchies in which
the Iraqis were portrayed as barbarians.52 Here, she was at once the heroic white
woman rising well above the savage men who captured her (and possibly raped
her, as some accounts have had it), and a damsel in distress whose rescue by even
more heroic Special Forces men again instantiated the virtuous superiority of the
invaders over the depraved occupied men. Interestingly, race here plays a multiple
role, because as others have shown, the four men and the other woman who were
also captured at the same time could not serve as the iconic representations of
American virtue in the same way. A woman’s body was needed, and a white one:
the other captured woman was a ‘black single mother [. . .], a body already marked
as illegitimate within the USA’s racialized politics, and indeed a body marked as
not even worth saving in the recasting of the story’.53
A much more banal representation of this seam of encounter, and perhaps in
many respects more important because more pervasive, has been the ease with
which women have moved into combat roles, serving the empire unquestioningly,
with their integration into these roles being celebrated as some form of liberationist
politics. A (male) Lieutenant Colonel in the Army writes
[o]n any given day in Iraq, an American soldier might be asked to search travellers at a
roadside check point, comfort distraught mothers whose children have been killed or
injured, search a woman’s quarters in a strictly Islamic household, or assist civilians whose
homes have been destroyed. Given the traditional role of women as peacekeepers and
humanitarians in their own homes, is it not illogical to believe that a woman could perform
each of these tasks as well, if not better.54
Thus, a gendered body becomes a necessary, indeed desired, adjunct or accessory
to an asymmetrical war of conquest and occupation. The gendered body serves the
functions of counterinsurgency – the ‘humanitarian’, ostensibly ‘softer’, tasks that
are required to ensure the winning of hearts and minds – much more eﬃciently and
eﬀectively. Celebratory accounts of such integration,55 or even critical analyses
which see the participation of women in acts of collective violence as an
instantiation of agency,56 ignore the fact that the equal opportunity to enter
combat in the service of empire does not necessarily have agential or liberatory
functions. When ‘women join men in the work of objectifying and psychologically
Used to Break Muslim Prisoners, Book Says’, Associated Press (28 January 2005).
52 Deepa Kumar, ‘War Propaganda and the (Ab)uses of Women: Media Constructions of the Jessica
Lynch Story’, Feminist Media Studies, 4 (2004), pp. 302–3.
53 Cristina Masters, ‘Femina Sacra: The “War on/of Terror”, Women and the Feminine’, Security
Dialogue, 40 (2009), pp. 36–7.
54 Lt. Colonel Henderson Baker, ‘Women in Combat: A Cultural Issue?’ (Carlisle Barracks: US Army
War College Master’s Thesis, 2006), p. 10.
55 See the jarring contribution by Solaro to an otherwise critical edited volume: Erin Solaro, ‘Women and
the Profession of Arms’, in Tara McKelvey (ed), One of the Guys: Women as Aggressors and Torturers
(Emeryville: Seal Press, 2007), pp. 97–110; also Solaro, Women; Kayla Williams with Michael E. Staub,
Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the US Army (London: Phoenix Press, 2005).
56 Sjoberg and Gentry, Mothers, Monsters.
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annihilating the “enemy”, finding ways to “eﬀeminize” him, if he is a man’57 they
essentially help reproduce a geopolitical dominance in which the ostensible gender
equality in the imperial metropole reinforces racial hierarchies in the conquered
and occupied colonies and peripheries.
A second space in the seam of encounter where genders are inflected through
racial, class, or imperial hierarchies is the site of encounter between the US military
men and the local security forces who act as proxies for the conquering military.58
Training and developing indigenous police and military forces is a central tenet of
counterinsurgency. The tasks here include ‘developing a US-style training base,
embedding advisors, initiating an intensive collective training programme, and
partnering American units with indigenous units’.59 Yet the local men, who often
risk opprobrium, and who often join the security forces as a way of guaranteeing
a livelihood in conditions where security is the only steady sort of income, are con-
stantly berated, ‘eﬀeminised’, called ‘women’ or ‘pussies’, and seen as inadequate
and passive enforcers of good order by their trainers.
Here, masculinity alone does not form the basis of transnational solidarity, and
again, gender hierarchies are strongly shaded by other factors, such as ‘class,
“race”/ethnicity, language and religion, subcultures, sexualities and almost any
other form through which humans understand diﬀerence, and strive to make it
count’.60
According to this logic, if a member of the local security forces does not fight
a war to which he does not necessarily have an allegiances, his manhood is
considered to be impaired. In an account of the US assault on Falluja, a
commander of the 1st Marine Regiment considers Iraqi policemen and Civil
Defense Corps troops who fled the devastation of that city to be inferior and
eﬀeminised: ‘When are these people going to discover their manhood and stand
and fight with us to save their city?’61 In this view, working for an occupying force
is what allows a man his masculinity, but sometimes even this acquiescence to
domination does not suﬃce. Where more circumspect oﬃcers speak of a lack of
maturity for an indigenous security force which does not perform as the imperial
military expects it,62 videos circulating on online sites have shown a much more
overtly gendered conversation between a US Marine trainer and Iraqi security
forces. The former questions the loyalty of the latter, and then calls them ‘bunch
of women’, ‘pussies’, and ‘cowards’, ‘too much of a fucking woman to die for his
country’, lacking a backbone and yet ‘killing Americans’ and refusing to fight
insurgents. When an Iraqi sneers at him, the marine challenges him to ‘going out
back and having his little ass being beaten’.63
57 Lynne Segal, ‘Gender, War, and Militarism: Making and Questioning the Links’, Feminist Review,
88 (2008), p. 33.
58 Lt. General James Dubik, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Building Security Forces and
Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2009).
59 Matthew W. Markel, ‘Building Partner Security Forces: Sometimes War Is the Answer’, The Joint
Forces Quarterly, 42 (2006), p. 76.
60 Carver, ‘Being a Man’, p. 456.
61 Alissa Rubin and Doyle McManus, ‘Why America Has Waged a Losing Battle on Fallouja’, Los
Angeles Times (24 October 2004).
62 Markel, ‘Building’.
63 ‘Lazy Iraqi Police get motivational speech’, available at: {http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
r1GrdTakvl8} accessed on 21 December 2009.
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In a context where a proxy force fights for an imperial one, the gendering of
these proxy forces can take two diﬀerent paths, which nevertheless share common
characteristics. On the one hand, the colonial discourse surrounding ‘martial races’
envisioned fighters in the service of empire who are ‘naturally’ fiercer fighters, more
disciplined and fearless warriors, and thus far more masculine in their bearing and
representation. The Kenyan Masai, the Nepalese Gurkhas, the Afghan Pathans (or
Pashtuns), the Indian Sikhs, and the Scottish Highlanders have all been considered
martial races. Heather Streets writes,
In the Indian Army, the codification of groups according to their status as ‘martial’ or
‘non-martial’ was part of a concerted strategy to limit military service to the select few who
could be trusted to remain undyingly loyal to the Raj. By contrast, in the British Army the
identification of Highlanders as martial races was meant to widen the popular appeal of the
army and to challenge both feminist claims of sin and degradation in the army and wider
concerns about the racial degeneration of British men.64
The other way in which such colonial war-fighting is gendered is through the
eﬀeminisation of the colonised man. Here, as McClintock writes with regards to
Africans, ‘the white race was figured as the male of the species and the black race
as the female’, while elsewhere, ‘imperial conquest was [seen] as a natural
expression of masculinity’ which then meant that the conquered were naturalised
as feminine, conquered, penetrated, and possessed.65
Although this may seem in the first glance contradictory, a certain set of
familiar tropes actually connect the two discourses to one another: a notion of
loyalty to the conquering empire representing a degree of masculinity, the necessity
to distinguish the ‘the proper man and the dissipated unmanned’,66 and a distinct
conflation of masculinity with particular notions of sexuality. As Levine has shown
the ‘oversexed native’ who lacks courage, independence, and moral vigour – all
masculine virtues – is portrayed as ‘the polygamist, the masturbator, the whorer,
and the sexually fluid’.67 Loyalty and military service to the empire is intended to
redeem him from this moral degeneracy. In the context of the War on Terror, the
men who are located in the seam of encounter are cast in these seemingly
contradictory ways: they can be at once courageous and manly allies and
sodomising homosexual rapists. A particularly revealing account from a former US
military man stationed in Afghanistan contains all the relevant tropes:
Homosexuality was pervasive among the Afghans, especially the Pashtuns in the south.
Even when they weren’t overtly engaged in acts of sex, they would cling to each other, hold
each other’s hand, and generally cavort in ways that would astonish Westerners and repulse
soldiers. Some of the marines would laugh incredulously. Others would be moved to violent
reactions. In one case, Fitzgerald watched a gigantic marine march furiously toward two
coupled Afghans and pick them up and toss them in diﬀerent directions like dogs, yelling
the whole time in English the Afghans couldn’t understand. The ‘female’ of the two
scurried away. The dominant male was sort of indignant and flipped his scarf over his
shoulder and walked oﬀ.68
64 Heather Streets, Martial Races and Masculinity in the British Army 1857–1914 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 173.
65 McClintock, Imperial Leather, p. 55; also see Philippa Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics:
Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 257.
66 Levine, Prostitution, p. 259.
67 Ibid., pp. 263–4.
68 Chris MacKey and Greg Miller, The Interrogator’s War: Inside the Secret War against Al Qaeda
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The Pashtun – or the warrior allies – in this narrative are compared to ‘dogs’ and
eﬀeminised not only because of the sexual acts of which the masculine US marines
disapprove, but also because they hold each other’s hand and ‘repulse’ Westerners
with their homosociality. Even the story, as it told, draws on masculine and
feminine images: a ‘gigantic Marine’ stands for unspoiled American masculinity,
while an ‘indignant’ Pashtun ‘flipped his scarf’ over a shoulder, invoking clichéd
imagery of petulant teenage girls flipping their hair in exasperation.
The seam of encounter then is the place where class, race, and gender are
brought together most urgently, with masculinities always hitched to a particular
kind of sexuality, and an iterative ordering of hierarchies is constantly performed.
Here, underprivileged working class women of the US can transcend the shackles
of their gender and class, as long as they weaponise their own bodies and
sexualities, and where indigenous men are made to ‘know their place’ in this
hierarchy via a strictly observed code of behaviour which always sees them as
eﬀeminate, degenerate, cowardly, and backwards, unless – but often not even when
– they throw their lot in with the occupying military, serving them as local police
forces.
The counterinsurgent women and the soldier-scholars of the metropole
While gendering works in familiar, even predictable, ways in the conquered spaces
and at the seam of encounter between counterinsurgency forces and the indigenous
men and women, gendering of counterinsurgency becomes much more fluid and
sometimes unpredictable in the metropole, where policies are formulated, ideolo-
gies are articulated, and wars are planned and legitimated.
Two ways in which counterinsurgency practice and discourse has become
gendered in the metropole have been most striking: on the one hand, the creation
of a new counterinsurgent masculinity – that of the soldier-scholar – and on the
other hand, the appropriation of a colonial feminist discourse and its saturating of
counterinsurgency discourse by women bureaucrats and policymakers who explic-
itly elide their counterinsurgency credentials to their gendered identities.
In analysing masculinities, Terrell Carver has written that ‘the rational-
bureaucratic modern man is not so distant from the warrior-protector man of
tradition, in that organized warfare and organized trade are not as conceptually,
constitutively and practically distant as one is led to think. Indeed, in terms of the
revolving doors between government oﬃcials (elected and non-elected) and the
arms trade and so-called defence industries, combined with the technologized
nature of contemporary “civilized” warfare (as opposed to supposed “terrorism”),
it would seem that the two masculinities are eﬀectively merged’.69 In a sense, this
applies to the soldier-scholar masculinity as well, but as important are the subtle
transformations and diﬀerences in the notion of masculinity that class brings in.
The soldier-scholars are numerous and now well-known. They are also
overwhelmingly represented in the ranks of the counterinsurgents. David Petraeus
(London: John Murray, 2004), p. 186; also see Kevin Burke, Civil Reconnaissance: Separating the
Insurgent from the Population (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).
69 Carver, ‘The Machine’, p. 78.
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(PhD in International Relations), David Kilcullen (PhD in Political Science), John
Nagl (PhD in History), H. R. McMaster (PhD in History), and Andrew Exum (a
soon-to-be-completed PhD in War Studies) are all vocal, articulate, and highly
educated military (or ex-military) men, all of whom are ranked above captain, all
of whom are engaged in policymaking vis-à-vis the War on Terror, and all of
whom are enthusiastic counterinsurgents. Some have written influential books and
articles on counterinsurgency, others have been online or think tank presences
pushing forward a counterinsurgency agenda, while Petraeus first directed the US
war eﬀort in Iraq and now leads the US Central Command. The soldier-scholars
all advance a notion of war-fighting which ostensibly takes into account political
nuances, aims to win over civilian populations, and deploys an openly liberal
discourse of salvation and humanitarianism. Not only is the soldier-scholar the
ultimate in civic virtue, he is also the embodiment of international wisdom,
war-fighting prowess, and a kind of knowingness about the world.70 This
transformation in the notion of masculinity is reflected in blogs and ad hoc writing
produced about counterinsurgency. The counterinsurgents want to be ‘soldiers’ and
find the term ‘warrior’ troubling. Thus, when Nathan Sassaman calls himself ‘the
Warrior King’, he and his book are roundly criticised by the counterinsurgents.71
Even the oﬃcial discourse around counterinsurgency reflects this shift. The US
Army and Marine Corps’ counterinsurgency field manual compares a regular
fighter to that ultimate icon of raw physical masculinity: a pugilist who is
nevertheless blind and is wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps
causing unintended harm.72 Access to military intelligence, on the other hand,
transforms the counterinsurgent into ‘surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while
keeping other vital organs intact’.73 On the one hand, we have the wholly corporeal
presence of the boxer; on the other, the precise intellect of the surgeon. The
theoreticians of counterinsurgency obviously prefer the latter. Not only does this
counter-positioning of boxers and surgeons contain an implicit notion of mascu-
linity, perhaps even more importantly, it hides within plain sight a particular
gradation of class. The boxer is the working class hero; the surgeon the upper
middle class professional. The former is emotional, embodied, perhaps even
irrational; the latter is intellectual, cool, steady-handed.
The soldier-scholar is particularly well-suited to the liberal interventionist model
which sees its job as cautiously and pragmatically doing the biddings of the US
national interest. Soldier-scholars are not interested in chest-thumping gestures,
deploy the language of ‘hearts and minds’ much more readily and see their wont
as being the wielders of softer or smarter power. Old school warriors see
counterinsurgency and the entire family of stability operations to which it belongs
as a diminishment of the inherent masculinity of the military:
70 Also see, R. Claire Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the
Civic Republican Tradition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
71 Nathan Sassaman and Joe Layden, Warrior King: The Triumph and Betrayal of an American
Commander in Iraq (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008); Thomas E. Ricks, ‘Fight Club: Excessive
force nearly lost us the Iraq War. The brass who gave the orders still don’t get it’, The Washington
Monthly (Aug/Sep/Oct 2008), available at: {http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.
ricks.html} accessed on 3 April 2009.
72 US Army, FM3–24, p. 41.
73 Ibid.
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In August 2000, for instance, General Sir Charles Guthrie, then Chief of the Defence Staﬀ
(CDS), said in an interview that ‘too many humanitarian missions could turn the
professional British Army into a “touchy-feely” organisation, more concerned with widows
and orphans than fighting’. The quote may misrepresent the tone of the interview but the
sentiments are widely shared, with many ‘senior oﬃcers’ believing that too great an
emphasis on PSO [Peace Support Operations] will result in British forces becoming a
peacekeeping gendarmerie with a diminished reputation.74
Notwithstanding the grumblings of conventional war-fighters, with the re-
emergence of the liberal interventionist doctrines of the Obama administration, the
soldier-scholars are on the ascendance.
Alongside this new form of masculinity, a much more familiar colonial
feminism is crucial in advancing a particularly new form of metropolitan warrior
femininity. The colonial feminism of today deploys the language of humanitarian
rescue.75 A ‘feminized security rhetoric has become commonplace in the admin-
istration, so much so that it is typical for an oﬃcial who gives a speech about
American actions in Iraq and Afghanistan or about the US policy of promoting
democracy around the world to draw the connection to the pursuit of women’s
rights.’76 This colonial feminism even admonishes ‘the terrorists’ for not picking
women. A former Pentagon oﬃcial complains that ‘In the years since [Leila]
Khaled’s hijackings, women’s involvement in Palestinian terrorism has been either
inconsistent or invisible. Even after proving their success as hijackers, bombers,
and cover for men, women have to remind terrorist leaders of their tactical
usefulness.’77 This colonial feminism is appealing to a new category of women
policymakers who pride themselves in a kind of collaborative warrior femininity.
These counterinsurgent women not only deploy a gendered analysis in their
discussion of counterinsurgency – ‘these type of operations require very perceptive
and deep emotional IQs’, and ‘women have a more collaborative style’ – but also
use feminist justifications for their involvement: ‘we aren’t going to win by telling
half the population they can’t play’.78
The counterinsurgent women have been particularly crucial in creating or
sustaining the ‘humanitarian’ elements of the War on Terror. The Human Terrain
System, for example, was originally conceived by a counterinsurgent woman,
Montgomery McFate, who wrote her doctoral thesis in cultural anthropology on
British counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, and who was for a while a highly
visible figure, both as target of US anthropologists’ anger, and as a fashionable and
über-feminine policy wonk79 who idolises military men – she even anonymously
74 Hills, ‘Hearts and Minds’, p. 5.
75 Lila Abu-Lughod, ‘Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on
Cultural Relativism and Its Others’, American Anthropologist, 104 (2002), pp. 783–90; Charles
Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood, ‘Feminism, the Taliban, and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency’,
Anthropological Quarterly, 75 (2002), pp. 107–22; Laura Shepherd, ‘Veiled References: Constructions
of Gender in the Bush Administration Discourse on the Attacks on Afghanistan Post-9/11’,
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 8 (2006), pp. 19–41.
76 Michaele Ferguson, ‘“W” Stands for Women: Feminism and Security Rhetoric in the Post-9/11 Bush
Administration’, Gender and Politics, 1 (2005), p. 18; also Margaret Denike, ‘The Human Rights of
Others: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and “Just Causes” for the “War on Terror”’, Hypatia, 23 (2008),
pp. 95–121.
77 Stack-O’Connor, ‘Picked Last’, p. 97.
78 Ackerman, ‘Women’.
79 Matthew Stannard, ‘Montgomery McFate’s Mission: Can one Anthropologist Possibly Steer the
Course in Iraq?’, San Francisco Chronicle (29 April 2007).
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ran a blog titled iluvamaninauniform. McFate, in becoming a fellow at the Oﬃce
of Naval Research, shed her nose-ring, ‘realizing “there were certain semiotic cues”
that would unnerve “paranoidal old white men”’.80 She found no contradiction
between her awareness of the gender diﬀerences of ‘old white men’ and
‘counterinsurgent women’ and the particularly militarist role that she envisioned
for social scientists.
As significant are the new category of women security scholars who circulate
between the domains of academy, think tanks and the policymaking world. Some
of these women have been prominent over the last decade. Sarah Sewall is, in
addition to having formerly headed the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard
University and having been the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Peacekeeping during the Clinton administration, has authored the foreword to the
US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.81 Samantha Power,
a strong advocate of humanitarian military intervention and the author of a book
about Rwanda is currently advisor and speech-writer for President Barak Obama,
and was involved in drafting his controversial Nobel speech in defence of US
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Similarly, the authors of the foreword and
introduction to the US Army Stability Operations Field Manual are also women,
Michèle Flournoy and Janine Davidson respectively.82 Flournoy is currently the
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy at the Obama Pentagon and was a
founder of Center for a New American Security, an influential security think tank
which has been a vocal advocate of counterinsurgency and the home of many
mid-level Obama defence oﬃcials. Davidson was in the Bush Pentagon’s Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Special Capabilities Directorate and is
the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans in the Obama Pentagon.
Among these women who combine a liberal interventionist ideology with
comfort with security-speak, a curious elision of femininity to a kind of hetero-
normative sexuality is present. The images of the counterinsurgent women shows
them as feminine, dressed in ball gowns, kissing their counterinsurgent oﬃcers, all
the while flaunting their warrior credentials (one counterinsurgent woman has been
a former air force pilot, the other a professor at the US Marine Corps University).
Others work in the Pentagon in various – and often influential – positions.
They are also increasingly present in the field of military operation. Two
women in particular are worth mentioning here: Sarah Chayes, advisor to General
McChrystal in Afghanistan, and Emma Sky, advisor to General Odierno in Iraq.
Neither women have ever spoken openly about gender, or feminism, or the ways
in which their being women may have influenced their work and their political
decisions. Yet, they both embody a kind of intersection of particular class, gender,
and ‘racial’ positionings, in a particular imperial context which makes them clear
embodiments of the new gender dynamics of counterinsurgency.
Both women come from non-military backgrounds; Chayes the daughter of
liberal Democrats who worked closely with President Kennedy; Sky, of a middle-
class background which provided her with private secondary education. Before
their careers as advisors to the military commanders of Afghanistan and Iraq,
80 Louisa Kamps, ‘Army Brat: How Did the Child of Peace-Loving Bay Area Parents Become the
Superstar of National Security Circles?’, in Elle (2008), pp. 309–11, 360–2.
81 US Army, FM3–24.
82 Ibid., FM3–07.
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Chayes was a journalist, Sky a development specialist working with the British
Department for International Development and the British Council. Both received
their educations in elite universities (Harvard and Oxford respectively), and both
have learned to speak the predominant language of the country in which they are
advisors (Sky speaks Arabic and Hebrew; Chayes has had tutoring in Arabic, but
has learned Pashto in Afghanistan). Both their previous work has had ‘anthropo-
logical’ elements, requiring close and intimate knowledge of the indigenous people
amongst whom they have worked. Both are often described in vocabulary that
emphasises their femininity: Chayes is tall and ‘stylish’; Sky is ‘petite’ (but
according to Andrew Exum’s counterinsurgency blog ‘one of those tough, intrepid
women the old British Empire excels at producing’).83 They both have assumed a
kind of a ‘drag’: While living in Afghanistan, Sarah Chayes decided to wear men’s
clothing, as a ‘lifestyle choice’.84 On one blog post someone writes about the ease
with which Sky changes tires – that manliest of manly tasks.85
Both these humanitarian workers, with their backgrounds of privilege and their
education, training, and experience in humanitarian development work have
become convinced of the good oﬃces of the military. On the one hand, they
represent the ‘soft’ feminised notion of politics: development work, NGO work,
reconciliation work, all posts that are often considered soft, emotional, and
womanly, and which are all too frequently populated by women also. Yet they
both see in the ‘new’ way of war, that is, the population-centric counterinsurgency
Odierno and McCrystal are fighting, a space for their experience. Sky, described as
a modern day Gertrude Bell,86 sees her advisory job as having a position of
influence, and speaks of loving the US Military: ‘she thinks the military is better
than the country it protects. “That’s the way I feel about it – America doesn’t
deserve its military”’.87 Chayes describes the US military as ‘public-spirited’ and
‘doing its darnedest to do the right thing’.88 There is even a familiar element of
‘screwball romance’ in the way the pairs McCrystal-Chayes and Odierno-Sky are
portrayed. The women come across as frank and sassy companions who don’t
hesitate to talk back.
In these pairings, the gendering becomes most clear: if the soldiers on the
ground, the working class, racialised, or underprivileged are expected to act
according to their station (even if that station is juggled through the imperial
reorderings that place a working class white US woman superior to an Iraqi
general), the privileged middle – and upper-class oﬃcers and policymakers so
clearly represented here portray a kind of metropolitan imperial gendering: the
83 Andrew Exum, ‘Lady Sky’ (28 April 2008) available at: {http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/
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softer masculinity of the soldier-scholar and the tough warrior femininity of the
development/counterinsurgent specialist meet comfortably in the middle, serving
the empire in the guise of a liberal, even ‘progressive’, gender positioning.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the gendered, racialised, and class-inflected hierarchy of power that
emerges out of the US era of counterinsurgency in the 21st century, shows the
particular ways in which counterinsurgency provides a fertile ground in which a
kind of new warrior masculinity regenerates itself through the figure of the
soldier-scholar, and the manner in which the self-declared emancipatory feminist
project is coopted by the metropolitan power complex in its projection of power
and force overseas. This reproduction of resilient and new forms of masculinity
and femininity shows not only the flexibility of the machinery of rule, but also the
dynamic recreation of power hierarchies throughout. In this (re)ordering, war-like
feminism and scholarly soldiering take their place at the top of pyramid of power.
Here, a kind of drag allows for a convergence of masculinities and feminisms,
whereas a few rungs further down, the imperial grunts themselves are much more
ensconced in the traditional warrior masculinities about whom a good deal of
lucidly critical scholarship has already been penned. Their masculinity emerges out
of a specific complex of class and racial/geopolitical positioning, where national
security discourses are unproblematically conjoined to hetero-normative tropes of
manliness, courage, and virtue.
Below the ‘manly’ imperial grunts are the working class white women who in
the seam of encounter with the indigenous forces find themselves elevated above
the colonised men they are charged to monitor, control or subdue. In their
interstitial position they can be rescued as damsels in distress by the hyper-
masculine Special Forces soldiers. While ambiguous, the empire gives them a
pathway to ‘climbing’ the ragged ladder of social mobility. Racialised women are
placed below them in this hierarchy, too troubling to the kinds of social order
envisioned in the empire to be named in heroic narratives of imperial rescue. And
at the very bottom layer of this pyramid of power are the conquered men and
women, their bodies subjected to violence and surveillance, their lives re-engineered
to suit urban counterinsurgencies, pacifications, population control, and the
winning of hearts and minds.
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